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Abstract: This study applies the skill-cell approach introduced by Borjas (2003) in order to 
identify the causal impact of immigration on the employment opportunities of resident workers, 
using data from two different samples, namely two waves of the Census of Population (1991 and 
2001) and the Greek Labour Force Survey (1998-2015). Grouping workers in three education 
and eight experience classes at the national level, we find small adverse effects on the 
employment outcomes of natives, that are generally not sensitive to alternative education and 
experience classifications and when accounting for the effective experience of immigrants. 
However, as for the period between 1998 and 2015, our findings appear to be driven by the 
negative influence of immigration ascertained in the sub-period during the Great Recession. 
Remarkably, there is some evidence of complementarity when the pre-recession period (1998-
2007) is considered. The less-skilled natives, appear to be the group of workers which is more 
vulnerable to immigration. Our results also indicate that the Greek economy has the capacity to 
accommodate large immigration flows in the long-run, without significant effects. Finally, 
contrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence consistent with the idea that migrants push 
natives towards complex, language-intensive tasks. 
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 “Population must always be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence.” 
Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) 
1. Introduction 
 
According to the surveys conducted by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Gang, Rivera-Batiz 
and Yun (2002), the less-skilled natives in the United States and Europe are more likely to stand in 
favour of policies aiming at limiting the number of migrants, because they anticipate that foreign-
born competitors will depress their wages or take their jobs4. More recently, the global recession 
and the refugee crisis of 2015 has revived Malthusian fears and further fueled negative sentiments 
against migrants among native workers. Likewise, the public debate over immigration has heated 
up in recent years in Greece, as national unemployment rate has reached a record high since the 
onset of the crisis, while at the same time thousands of migrants seeking to move towards Western 
Europe are trapped in the country. 
As one might expect, most research focuses on the effects of immigration on traditional 
migration countries in North America (Australia, Canada, United States) and Europe (France, 
Germany, UK). There is also a growing literature in more recent immigration countries (Italy, 
Spain)5. The main message conveyed by the vast empirical literature is that the effects of 
immigration are close to zero (see e.g. Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot, 2005; Card, 2009). A notable 
exception involves the recent work of Borjas (2003, 2014, 2015) and Borjas, Grooger and Hanson 
(2012) who report large adverse effects on the earnings of the less-skilled natives.  
Surprisingly, little attention has been devoted to this subject in Greece, although the country 
has experienced very large immigration flows since the end of socialism in Eastern European 
countries in the late 1980s6. Specifically, the first major immigration episode took place in 1990 
                                                 
4
 On the other hand, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that the negative attitudes of natives towards immigration are 
driven by racial prejudice rather than due to fears about labour market competition. This finding is consistent with the 
empirical literature that shows that the effect of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives is negligible.  
5
 See section 3 for a brief view of this literature.  
6
 We are aware about two simulation-based studies. Sarris and Zografakis (1999) using a computable general 
equilibrium approach show that illegal migrants adversely affect the real disposable incomes of households headed by 
an unskilled person. By contrast, they find that households that are headed by skilled workers or by inactive individuals 
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where mostly unskilled immigrants driven by push factors, mainly from Albania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine entered the country. The second massive wave of 
immigrants occurred in 1997 with the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania. Immigration 
then continued with undiminished intensity during the 2000s until the global credit crunch ended 
abruptly a long period of economic expansion in 2008 and eventually stabilized the number of 
migrants in the country.  
Greece offers a unique environment for examining how immigration can affect the labour 
market outcomes of natives. First, the Greek labour market abounds in institutional features (i.e. 
minimum wage laws, rigid wage bargaining, strict employment protection regulations, inflexible 
working time arrangements), that prevent wages from adjusting downwards in response to supply 
and demand shocks (OECD, 2011)7. Past research of Western European countries revealed, 
contrary to the general perception, that more flexible labour laws prevent wage losses via positive 
reallocation of natives towards more complex and language intensive tasks, complementary to 
manual intensive tasks where immigrants have comparative advantage (e.g. D’ Amuri and Peri, 
2014)8. What is more, the Greek product market is also characterized as over-regulated (IMF, 2013) 
and it is well-known that barriers to entry, excess bureaucracy and other impediments to “ease of 
doing business” are associated with greater adverse effects of immigration (e.g. Angrist and Kugler, 
2003). Hence, we these issues in mind, the first question we seek to answer is: How does a rigid 
by international comparison labour and product market absorb an immigration induced labour 
supply shock? 
                                                 
such as pensioners benefit from illegal immigration. Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013) employing a search and 
matching framework report evidence that immigration generates gains for skilled natives in terms of wages and 
employment, while its impact on unskilled natives is ambiguous. 
7
 Evidence of limited wage flexibility in Greece is also reported by Clar, Dreger and Ramos (2007), Babecky, Du Caju, 
Kosma, Lawless, Messina and Rõõm (2010), Fabiani, Kwapil, Rõõm, Galuscak and Lamo (2010). On the other hand, 
Livanos (2008) provides empirical evidence that contradicts with the policy recommendations of the OECD, i.e. wages 
are not rigid.  
8
 Note that standard economic theory implies that the short-run adjustment to immigration in flexible labour markets 
involves changes in wages rather than in employment. By contrast, if wage flexibility is limited, one would expect 
significant adverse effects on the employment of competing natives. 
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Furthermore, Greece, contrary to other traditional immigration attracts very few high-skilled9 
migrants and is the only EU country where almost 45% of immigrants stem from a single country, 
namely Albania. It is well-documented in the literature that if immigrants are over-represented in 
one skill group relative to natives, this group losses in terms of wages and employment (see e.g. 
Gaston and Nelson, 2000; Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2005; Card, 2009). On top of that, lower 
cultural and birthplace diversity may also result in smaller benefits in terms of complementarity 
and productivity (see e.g. Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapopor, 2016). Based 
on these considerations, the second question we investigate is: Do the less-skilled natives bear the 
potential costs of immigration in Greece? 
Third, after Greece adopted the euro in 2001, low interest rates stimulated economic growth, 
but at the same time, the imprudent borrowing eventually resulted in losing capital market access 
in 2009. Consequently, Greece entered into a prolonged depression and successive economic 
adjustment programmes with EU, ECB and IMF. While past research has shown that host countries 
have the capacity to absorb immigration in good times without losses in terms of wages and 
employment (see. e.g. Card, 2009; Peri and Sparber. 2009), few studies have analyzed the short-
run consequences of immigration during contraction. Hence, the third question we ask is: Does the 
impact of immigration on the labour market opportunities of natives depend on the stage of the 
business cycle during which is examined? 
Fourth, taking advantage of the fact that the first important immigration episodes, which took 
place in the 1990s, resemble, to a large extent, a natural experiment, and the Greek economy was 
unprepared to absorb large and sudden migration waves, we ask whether the impact of migration 
is more substantial during the earlier phases. 
Finally, contrary to other traditional migration countries, Greece exhibits pronounced 
segmentation between a formal and an informal sector10. The former offers complex, non-manual 
                                                 
9
 According to the EULFS, the skilled-unskilled ratio is 1.6. for natives and 3.4 for immigrants.  
10
 The widely cited study by Schneider and Enste (2000) estimates that the informal economy in Greece is about 29.6 
percent of GDP. 
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jobs, but at the same time, there is limited access for the outsiders, because of legally imposed entry 
barriers by the insiders. By contrast, the informal sector is unregulated and offers low-paid, non-
complex jobs. With these issues in mind, the fifth question we seek to address is whether the 
positive reallocation of natives towards more complex jobs, recently proposed in the literature, can 
be ascertained for the case of Greece. 
Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to address these questions and contribute to the 
European literature by presenting empirical evidence on an unresolved issue, focusing on a country 
characterized by institutional features that prevent labour market clearing. To this end we employ 
the national or skill-cell approach introduced by Borjas (2003), using the latest available data from 
the Greek Labour Force Survey (GRLFS). The GRLFS sample covers the period between 1998 
and 2015. In addition, we use Census data for 1991 and 2001 from IPUMS-I (2015). We then slice 
the Greek labour market into education and work experience segments and examine the short-run, 
partial effect of immigration on the labour market opportunities of the native workforce, by 
regressing four measures of employment and earnings on year-to-year variation in immigrant share 
across skill-cells. Contrary to earlier studies of immigration, the skill-cell analysis is a robust way 
to identify the causal impact of immigration, as long as the participation of natives across cells is 
unaffected by the presence of immigrants. Finally, we also control for the possibility that the pre-
immigration labour market experience is not valued in the Greek labour market.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Overall, immigration appears to deteriorate 
the employment opportunities of natives either when the Census or the GRLFS data are used. By 
contrast, there is no significant correlation between natives’ earnings and migrants. These findings 
survive several robustness tests. Yet, when splitting our GRLFS sample in two (1998-2007 and 
2008-2015), there is stark contrast in the results. In particular, there is robust evidence that 
immigration deteriorates the labour market opportunities of natives, during the period of the Great 
Recession. At the same time, we find evidence of complementarity for the pre-recession period. 
We also provide empirical evidence that in the long-run (i.e. after 10 years) the impact of 
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immigration dissolves. Finally, the national approach indicates, contrary to previous studies, that 
immigrants do not trigger a positive reallocation of natives towards complex jobs. By contrast, we 
find evidence that natives move towards routine-intensive tasks. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper is organized  as  follows:  In  the  next  Section we  offer some 
key statistics about immigration in Greece. In Section 3 we present the theoretical considerations 
and make a detailed review of the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data. In 
Section 4 we discuss the methodology followed in order to estimate the impact of immigration. 
Section 5 offers evidence about the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives. Sections 
6-9 report and discuss the main empirical results of the skill-cell analysis. Finally, Section 10 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Immigration in Greece.  
 
Since the end of 1980s, push (the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe) and 
pull factors (economic stability until 2008) transformed Greece from an emigration to an 
immigration country. According to Population Censuses, the share of immigrants in Greece has 
increased rapidly, rising from 1.6% in 1991 to 9.2% in 2011. The largest group of foreign-born 
citizens in 2011 was citizens of Albania (480 thousand), followed by citizens of Bulgaria (76 
thousands), Romania (47 thousand), Pakistan (34 thousand) and Georgia (27 thousand). 
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Figure 1. Foreign-born population by country of birth. Source: Population Census 2011 
 
 
Figure 2 reports the immigrant share in the labour force (age 15-64) in the 13 administrative 
regions of Greece. As can be seen, immigrant workers are concentrated predominantly in few 
regions, namely Attiki, Central Macedonia, Crete and South Aegean. In the top immigration region, 
Attiki, for every 100 native-born labour force participants there are about 15 foreigners. On the 
other hand of the spectrum, the share of immigrants on total labour force falls below 5% in Western 
Macedonia. 
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Ukraine
USA
UK
Turkey
Syria
Serbia
Russia
Romania
Poland
Philippines
Pakistan
Nigeria
Moldova
Italy
Iraq
India
Germany
Georgia
France
Egypt
Cyprus
China
Bulgaria
Bangladesh
Armenia
Albania
Afganistan
 8
 
Figure 2. Spatial distribution of immigrants in Greek administrative regions (2015). Authors’ 
calculations on GRLFS data 
 
Greece is somewhat different from many other immigration countries in terms of the education 
distribution of its immigrants. According to the GRLFS, roughly half of immigrants (48%), are 
concentrated in the lowest level of educational spectrum, that is, lower secondary education or 
below, compared to 37% of native population. On the other hand, the share of immigrants with 
university education (14%) falls short of the native share (24%). As can be seen in Figure 3, in 
2015, foreign-born workers constitute about 20% of the labour force of the less-skilled workers, 
about double the share of total workforce. By contrast, the immigrant share on medium-skilled 
labour force is near the average, while it falls below as far as the high-skilled workforce is 
concerned. 
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Figure 3. Immigrant share in total labour force by education group  
 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the intensity of routine vs complex tasks for the average native 
worker and two groups of immigrants, defined according to their years of residence in Greece, 
namely recent and veteran immigrants. As can been easily verified, natives specialize in more 
complex tasks relative to immigrants. What is more, consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants 
specialization differs with language proficiency, the figure suggests that recent immigrants are 
involved in more manual, routine-intensive tasks than veteran immigrants. 
The Appendix Table A1 offers pairwise correlations between experience and education 
dummies and four task measures, namely routine task intensity, abstract, routine and service task 
importance11. The correlation with the experience dummies, albeit is very low, suggests that the 
intensity of routine vs complex tasks declines with years of work experience. On the other hand, 
there is a strong negative correlation between the relative intensity and the high education dummy. 
                                                 
11
 Routine tasks require repetitive physical strength or non-complex cognitive skills. Abstract tasks are complex 
problem solving. Service tasks are non-routine tasks, usually performed by workers with lower levels of education. 
See Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010) for further details. 
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Figure 4. Routine task intensity, natives and immigrants. Authors’ calculations on GRLFS data 
matched with data reported by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010). Routine task intensity is 
defined as Routine task importance divided by the sum of Abstract and Service task importances 
 
2. Theoretical considerations and previous literature 
 
In this section, we discuss the mechanisms proposed in the economic literature by which 
immigration can affect the labour market opportunities of native-born population12. As is common, 
we distinguish between first-round and second-round effects. The former entails the short-run 
adjustments to immigration, based on the canonical model of the labour market, while the latter 
refers to a set of secondary adjustments (i.e. specialization of natives in communication and 
cognitive intensive tasks, capital responses, changes in output mix, internal migration). We also 
review the relevant empirical literature on the labour market impact of immigration. 
The standard textbook model of the labour market, assuming labour homogeneity, predicts that 
immigration lowers the earnings of natives of comparable education, pushing some of them out of 
the labour force, because at the new equilibrium the offered wage falls below their reservation 
                                                 
12
 For extensive reviews of the literature, see Borjas (1994); Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Okkerse (2008) among others. 
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wage13. When there is skill diversity within native and foreign-born population, the impact of 
immigration depends on whether it changes the balance of skills in the host country. For instance, 
if the ratio of unskilled versus skilled immigrants is higher than that of natives, immigration is 
expected to exert a negative influence on the labour market outcomes of the less-skilled natives. 
By contrast, the high-skilled gain from immigration in terms of wages and employment (see e.g. 
Alntonji and Card, 1991; Gaston and Nelson, 2000; Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2005, Card, 
2009).  
However, there are several channels through which the less-skilled native-born individuals can 
protect themselves from immigrant competitors in the long-run. First, the seminal paper of Peri and 
Sparber (2009) provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the United States that the most 
vulnerable group of natives (i.e. the less-skilled) respond to immigration by moving into 
occupations that require communication skills where they have comparative advantage. At the 
same time, immigrants with the same educational attainment concentrate in occupations that 
require manual skills. Consequently, the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants 
implies lower losses than those implied by the canonical model of labour supply and demand. 
Likewise, D’Amuri and Peri (2014) report positive reallocation of natives towards occupations 
requiring more abstract and complex skills in a panel of 15 Western European countries for the 
1996-2010 period. This process however, is found to be slower during the Great Recession, that is, 
between 2007 and 2010. What is more, Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011), and Ortega and 
Verdugo (2014) also find evidence in favor of occupational upgrading of natives due to 
immigration in Spain and France respectively. Apart from the positive occupational allocation, 
natives also tend to acquire more education in response to immigration. Skill upgrading means that 
natives avoid competition with immigrants and less pronounced wage pressures (e.g. Hickman and 
Olney, 2011; Hunt, 2012). 
                                                 
13
 Johnson’s (1980) elaborate model implies that the magnitude of the effects of immigration depends upon the degree 
of elasticity of labour supply and demand. When the labour supply or the labour demand are more elastic, wages and 
employment are expected to change less. 
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Second, Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2008, 2012) emphasize on the importance of physical capital 
adjustment. Initially, the decline in capital-labour ratio drives wages down. However, the higher 
profitability of capital in the short-run attracts investments and hence attenuates the first-round 
effects of immigration. The degree of capital mobility determines the extent at which wages are 
restored to the pre-immigration levels. Besides that, product market flexibility is also crucial, since 
barriers to entry deter new entrants and are expected to aggravate the negative effects of 
immigration on natives (see e.g. Angrist and Kugler, 2003). 
Third, immigrants except for workers are also consumers and increase the demand for domestic 
goods and services. In this context, immigrants’ participation in the goods market increases the 
prices of domestic goods, thereby creating their own demand for labour and hence damping the 
adverse effects implied by the standard labour market model. (see e.g Hercowitz and Yashiv 2002; 
Bodvarsson, Van den Berg and Lewer, 2008). 
Fourth, immigrants are generally considered to accept lower wages either because of lower 
bargaining power (see e.g. Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri and Poutvaara, 2014) or due to lower 
reservation wage (see e.g. Constant, Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann, 2010). This stylized fact 
encourages firms to create more jobs since it lowers the expected wage they have to pay and 
mitigates the initial adverse effects of the supply shock (see e.g. Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2013). 
A fifth adjustment mechanism involves the absorption of the supply shock through changes in 
output mix rather than changes in factor prices (Rybczynski Theorem, 1955). Most studies 
however, find no empirical evidence that immigration causes changes in industry mix. Instead, they 
document that industries respond to migration by using unskilled labour more intensively (see e.g. 
Lewis, 2003; Dustmann and Glitz 2008; Gonzalez and Ortega, 2011). 
Last and less important, there is some evidence in the United States that natives respond to 
immigration by moving into cities with lower immigration rates. By moving out, natives 
counterbalance the supply shock induced by immigrants and hence mitigate the initial negative 
effects on their employment opportunities. The empirical literature in this field produces conflicting 
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results. On the one hand, this prediction is supported by Frey (1995) and Borjas (2006) who find a 
significant positive correlation between immigrant inflows and native outflows.  On the other hand, 
Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) document that intercity mobility rates of natives are not 
sensitive to immigration14. Instead, they report evidence that natives and immigrants are attracted 
by the same cities. 
Beginning with Grossman’s (1982) seminal paper, there is a vast empirical literature examining 
the above theoretical considerations. Since the early 2000s, the spatial correlations approach 
pioneered by Altonji and Card (1991) used to be the dominant method in identifying the causal 
relationship between natives labour market outcomes and immigration. Spatial correlations build 
on the assumption that the host economy can be divided in two regional labour markets, and that 
only one of the two receives immigrants who are perfect substitutes for natives. The impact of 
immigration is then measured by comparing the labour market performance of natives between the 
regions (e.g. Bodvarsson and van den Berg, 2013). Empirically, this is done by regressing labour 
market outcomes (wages, employment, participation and so forth) on regional variation of the 
immigrant share.  
However, spatial correlations are often criticized for suffering from endogeneity. The fact that 
immigrants tend to cluster into regions with booming economic conditions can be a confounding 
factor for negligible effects reported by such studies (see e.g. Borjas, 1994 and 2003)15. To address 
this issue, most studies employ an instrumental variables approach using lagged immigrant 
concentrations. The idea is that immigrants tend to go in the same cities as old co-nationals (Bartel, 
1989). Hence, this strategy aims to isolate the exogenous (supply-push) component of immigration 
in order to capture its causal relationship with the relevant measures of labour market outcomes of 
                                                 
14As for Europe, Pischke and Velling (1997), and Glitz (2012) find that native outflows are not associated with higher 
immigration in German counties. Likewise, little evidence for inter-regional mobility of natives is reported by Hatton 
and Tani (2005) for the UK. 
15
 A second problem of the spatial correlations is that natives may respond to immigration from abroad by moving out 
from regions with high immigrant concentrations. However, as we discussed earlier in this section, most of the 
empirical studies do not find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. 
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natives. Nevertheless, even when controlling for endogeneity, the majority of the spatial 
correlations studies fail to detect large adverse effects on resident workers (see e.g. Altonji and 
Card, 1991; LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Pischke and Velling, 1997; Card, 2001; Lewis, 2003; 
Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2005; Gonzalez and Ortega, 2011)16.  
Borjas (2003) introduces a new methodological approach to measure the labour market impact 
of immigration that is not contaminated by the endogeneity bias of the spatial correlations. Instead 
of using regional variation of migrant concentrations, Borjas focuses on the national labour market 
and groups workers in education and experience cells17. Hence, this method excludes the possibility 
that immigrants are self-selected into cells where wages or the probability of employment are 
higher, since only educational upgrading allows workers to switch between skill-cells. What is 
more, individuals are perfect substitutes within education groups unless they belong to different 
experience groups. On the other hand, workers with the same educational attainment are imperfect 
substitutes as long as they possess different levels of labour market experience. Borjas using Census 
data for the 1960-2000 period finds that a 10% rise in immigration reduces on average weekly 
earnings by about 4%. Estimations within schooling groups imply large adverse effects on those 
workers with at most high school education and positive effects on college graduates. 
Nevertheless, this methodology is not immune to criticism. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) 
challenged Borjas findings by allowing for imperfect substitutability across and within skill-cells. 
They also focus on the long-run effects of immigration by allowing full capital stock adjustment to 
                                                 
16
 Some other studies deal with endogeneity by looking at natural experiments, that is, exogenous, supply push 
immigrant inflows. For instance, Card (1990) analyzes the impact of Cuban immigrants in Miami. Another examples 
are Algerian “repatriates” in France (Hunt, 1992), Russian immigrants in Israel (Friedberg, 2001), “retornados” from 
African colonies in Portugal (Carrington and de Lima, 1999). Although migration is driven by political changes in the 
source countries in all instances, these studies also report negligible effects on the labour market performance of 
resident workers. Recently, Borjas (The wage impact of Marielitos: A Reappraisal, forthcoming at the Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review) re-evaluates the impact in Miami labour market and finds evidence that contradicts with 
Card’s conclusions. More precisely, he concludes that the average drop experienced by the less-skilled Miamians was 
between 10 and 30 percent. 
17
 Some other studies slice the national labour market in occupations instead of education-experience cells. See for 
instance, Friedberg (2001) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2007). 
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restore the capital-labour ratio in the wage simulations. In this framework, Ottaviano and Peri find 
a positive effect on native wages and a negative effect on the wages of previous immigrants. 
Regarding empirical evidence from skill-cell analysis for European labour markets, Bonin 
(2005) finds small wage effects and no employment effects on native workers in the German labour 
market. Carrasco, Jimenez and Ortega (2008) find no significant effects in Spain for the second 
half of the 1990s. Likewise, D’ Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010) investigating the impact of 
immigration in Western Germany for the 1987-2001 period find little evidence of adverse effects 
on natives. Instead, they report large adverse employment effects on previous immigrants. 
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) find evidence of imperfect substitution between 
immigrants and natives within age-education cells in the UK. Ortega and Verdugo (2014) report 
positive effects of immigration on the wages and employment of resident workers on the French 
labour market, partially explained by the positive re-allocation of natives towards communication 
and cognitive intensive tasks.  
 
3. Data  
 
Our examination of the impact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives relies 
on data from two different samples. Firstly, we use data from two waves of Census of Population 
for 1991 and 2001. Secondly, we employ data from the GRLFS. The time period used in the 
estimation consists of 18 years span from 1998-2015. The dependent variables are the log of 
monthly wage1819, deflated to 2010 euros by using the CPI series, the unemployment to labour force 
ratio, the employment to population ratio and the weekly average hours worked20. When we 
aggregate for the employment variables and immigration share, we use the personal weight 
                                                 
18
 We follow Borjas (2003) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2012) and take the mean of the log wages of natives 
when aggregating the LFS data for native workers instead of the log of the average wages. 
19
 Since the GRLFS asks individuals to report their wage in bands, rather than precise figures, we follow the common 
practice and use the median wage per band in our estimations. For some recent applications with GRLFS wages see 
among others Livanos (2008) and Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014, 2016). 
20
 Employment to population ratio and unemployment to labour force are calculated using the EULFS variable ilostat. 
Average hours worked are given by the variable hwactual. 
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provided by the GRLFS (variable COEFF). As for wages, we pre-multiply the personal weight 
provided by the GRLFS by the actual number of weekly hours worked (variable or_rR) and then 
we take the weighted average across skill-cells using the above product as the weight. 
The analysis is carried out employing data on male individuals aged 15-64. We classify natives 
into three education categories, those with lower secondary education or below, those with upper 
secondary educational attainment, and college graduates. As it is common in the relevant literature 
we define immigrants all those individuals born outside Greece. Labour market experience is 
calculated as age minus age of entry in the labour market21. We assume that individuals with lower 
secondary education or below, secondary education, university education, post-tertiary education 
enter the labour market at 17, 19, 23 and 27 years of age respectively.  Following Borjas (2003) we 
restrict our analysis to individuals with 1 to 40 years of labour market experience. The three skill 
categories are grouped into 5 year experience intervals, that is, 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26-
30, 31-36, 36-40. Consequently, we end with twenty four education by experience cells in each 
calendar year. 
Our key independent variable is the ratio of immigrants in the labour force to the total labour 
force. More precisely, the immigrant supply shock in each skill cell is given by:  
 =  +  
where   and   denote respectively the number of natives and immigrants in the education-
experience cell. Figure 5 shows the supply shocks experienced by different skill groups between 
1998 and 2015. As can be seen, the group experienced the largest supply shock is that of the less-
skilled natives. However, the share of immigrants declines with experience in 1998 and 2006. On 
the other hand, it follows an inverted U-shaped pattern in 2015.As for the groups of high school 
                                                 
21
 Because it is not possible to account for the workers’ actual experience in the labour market, and since potential 
experience is prone to errors, we check the robustness of our baseline results in section 6 by assigning workers into 
age instead of experience classes. 
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and university graduates, the largest immigrant concentrations are generally observed in the middle 
experience classes. 
 
Figure 5. The Share of Immigrants per Education/Experience Cell in 1998, 2006 and 2015 
Notes. The Figure illustrates the supply shocks experienced by the different skill-groups between 
1998 and 2015. Experience groups (1, 2, 3,..., 8) are defined in five-year intervals (1-5, 6-10, 11-
15, ..., 36-40 years). Low education corresponds to less than primary, primary and lower 
secondary education. Medium education corresponds to upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary education. High education corresponds to bachelor or equivalent, master or 
equivalent and doctoral or equivalent. 
 
 
4. The skill-cell approach 
 
To examine the effect of foreign-born workers on the employment opportunities of resident 
workers we use the national labour market approach introduced by Borjas (2003). To that end, we 
estimate the following specification22:  
 	 = 
 +  +  +  +  ×  +  ×  +  ×  +  (1) 
                                                 
22
 Except otherwise specified, we use analytic weights in STATA in order to down-weight cells with small number of 
observations. The weight is the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. 
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where 	 is the value of the mean labour market outcome for Greek workers in cell (i, j, t), 
namely the mean log monthly wage the unemployment to labour force, the employment to 
population, and the average hours worked,  is a vector of dummies indicating the educational 
attainment,  is a vector of experience dummies,  is a vector of time dummies,  ×  stands 
for the interaction between education and experience fixed effects,  ×  is the interaction 
between education and year fixed effects, and  ×  is the interaction between experience and 
year fixed effects.  
This saturated model with the full set of fixed effects and their interactions reduces the risk of 
spurious correlation due to omitted variables bias and guarantees that the estimated coefficients 
represent an approximation of the causal impact of immigration23. Specifically, the interactions of 
education and experience with the year dummies control for the possibility that the impact of 
education and experience is not uniform over time, while the linear fixed effects and the interaction 
of education by experience accounts for demand shocks specific to each skill class. 
 
5. Preliminary evidence 
 
In this section, we present some basic results regarding the occupational distribution of natives 
and immigrants, as well as simple scatter plots that convey the main results of the present paper. 
Following Borjas (2003), Steinhardt (2011) and Ortega and Verdugo (2014), we compute Welch’s 
(1999) index of congruence, which is similar to a correlation coefficient, that is, equals one when 
there is absolute equal occupational distribution between the two groups, while minus implies the 
opposite relationship. The index is given by the following relationship: 
  =
∑  −  − /
∑  −  ∑  − /
 
(2) 
                                                 
23
 Ottaviano and Peri (2012) juxtapose that such a demanding model absorbs a very large part of panel variation and 
results in inflated standard errors. 
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where  is the proportion of group ℎ ℎ = ", $ employed in occupation %, and   is the 
labor-force average. 
 
Table 1 Index of Congruence of Occupational Distributions within Education Group, 1998-2015 
 
Experience of immigrants 
Education-experience  
of native groups: 1-10 years 11-20 years 21-30 years 31-40 years 
Primary and lower secondary 
education 
    
1-10 years 0.483 0.438 0.370 0.305 
11-20 years 0.436 0.439 0.399 0.343 
21-30 years 0.315 0.354 0.372 0.345 
31-40 years 0.250 0.297 0.331 0.311 
Upper secondary education 
    
1-10 years 0.362 0.046 -0.064 -0.117 
11-20 years 0.015 -0.155 -0.200 -0.206 
21-30 years -0.199 -0.199 -0.189 -0.166 
31-40 years -0.262 -0.268 -0.240 -0.207 
University graduates 
    
1-10 years 0.556 0.314 0.082 0.056 
11-20 years 0.529 0.362 0.128 0.096 
21-30 years 0.513 0.381 0.174 0.141 
31-40 years 0.527 0.418 0.246 0.197 
Note. The table reports the index of congruence across 52 occupations for the 1998-2015 period 
between natives and immigrants with the same educational background. The index is defined in 
equation (2). Authors’ calculations on GRLFS data. 
 
The results (reported in Table 1) suggest that the less-skilled (lower secondary education or 
below) and the high-skilled (university graduates) native and foreign-born workers are generally 
clustered into similar occupations within education and experience cells, although the correlation 
is significantly lower than the evidence from the United States and France indicates . On the other 
hand, the evidence indicates that natives and foreigners with high school diploma work in different 
occupational segments 
Before proceeding with our empirical analysis, it is useful to demonstrate the link between our 
key measures of the labour market performance of natives, namely monthly wages, aggregate 
employment and unemployment, and the immigrant share within these schooling-experience 
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groups. Figure 6, using the data partially reported in Table 2 and Appendix Tables A2, A3 and A4, 
depicts simple correlations between the aforementioned variables over the period between 1998 
and 201524. As can be observed, the scatter diagram documents a strong positive (negative) relation 
between natives’ unemployment (employment, earnings) and immigration. In addition, it is evident 
that the link between immigration and the labour market outcomes is not driven by outlying 
observations. 
 
Table 2 Distribution of Immigrants in the Labour Force by Level of Education and Experience, 
1998-2015 
Education Years of Experience 1998 2002 2006 2010 2015 
Lower secondary and below  1-5 0.129 0.203 0.213 0.340 0.091 
 
6-10 0.132 0.159 0.209 0.391 0.204 
 
11-15 0.106 0.157 0.209 0.313 0.339 
 
16-20 0.091 0.132 0.172 0.319 0.310 
 
21-25 0.050 0.085 0.141 0.268 0.331 
 
26-30 0.043 0.068 0.082 0.183 0.241 
 
31-35 0.034 0.048 0.066 0.105 0.145 
 
36-40 0.012 0.020 0.031 0.071 0.097 
High school graduates 1-5 0.058 0.056 0.063 0.115 0.067 
 
6-10 0.064 0.069 0.073 0.092 0.062 
 
11-15 0.063 0.083 0.077 0.095 0.064 
 
16-20 0.070 0.080 0.081 0.130 0.067 
 
21-25 0.060 0.069 0.090 0.113 0.088 
 
26-30 0.029 0.059 0.067 0.078 0.099 
 
31-35 0.055 0.061 0.062 0.094 0.080 
 
36-40 0.054 0.048 0.053 0.078 0.073 
University graduates 1-5 0.048 0.052 0.019 0.034 0.017 
 
6-10 0.063 0.068 0.049 0.035 0.028 
 
11-15 0.042 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.021 
 
16-20 0.059 0.063 0.040 0.052 0.039 
 
21-25 0.058 0.055 0.034 0.051 0.042 
 
26-30 0.041 0.073 0.078 0.063 0.055 
 
31-35 0.061 0.072 0.064 0.073 0.061 
 
36-40 0.024 0.097 0.059 0.097 0.058 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 More precisely, Figure 6 plots the residuals from regressing unemployment, employment and average earnings on 
education, experience and year fixed effects, against the residuals from regressing immigration on education, 
experience and year fixed effects. 
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Panel A Slope of the regression line: 0.32, standard error 0.04 
 
Panel B Slope of the regression line: -0.46, standard error 0.04 
 
Panel C Slope of the regression line: -0.39, standard error 0.10 
 
 FIGURE 1 Scatter Diagram relating immigration and three measures of the labour market 
performance of natives
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6. Results 
 
Thus far, we have provided some preliminary evidence, that unskilled and skilled immigrants 
and natives of the same educational attainment have quite similar occupational distribution. On the 
contrary, high school graduates appear to cluster into different occupations. In this section, we 
present the main findings of the present paper and several robustness checks of the results. The first 
set of empirical results are shown in Table 3, where the dependent variable is the mean value of 
the employment outcomes of natives across education-experience cells, namely unemployment to 
labour force, employment to population and weekly average hours worked, and the main 
explanatory variable is the immigrant share. As we discussed in Section 4, we follow Borjas (2003) 
and include the full set of possible fixed effects in order to control for omitted variables bias, that 
is, we use education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as education by year, experience 
by year and education by experience fixed effects. We also report heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors that are clustered within education-experience cells. 
The first row of Table 3 indicates that immigration is negatively correlated with the employment 
and average hours, and positively with the unemployment of male workers. The estimated 
coefficients imply that a 10% increase in the labour supply due to immigration increases native 
unemployment by 1.8% and decreases native employment and average hours by 3% and 1.6%25. 
In the second row, we examine whether veteran immigrants (i.e. those with more than 10 years in 
Greece) are closer substitutes with recent immigrants than natives do. As it is evident, the positive 
correlation between immigration and the unemployment rate of veteran immigrants is stronger. 
However, the findings for the employment and average hours do not comport with the hypothesis 
that labour market competition is heavier among immigrants. 
                                                 
25
 The results are converted into elasticities by multiplying the estimated coefficients by 1/1 + $, where $ =
/. The mean value of the share of immigrants during the period under consideration is about 8.98%. The 
elasticities reported in the main text are then given by 0.219 × 0.84, −0.365 × 0.84 and  −0.196 × 0.84. See Borjas 
(2003) for more details. 
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In rows (3) and (4), we examine whether the impact of immigration is different before and 
during the Great Recession, started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Indeed, our 
findings indicate that immigration has a robust adverse effect on the employment outcomes of 
natives during the economic downturn. On the other hand, immigration appears to have been 
absorbed by the Greek economy over the course of the economic expansion (1998-2007) without 
negative effects on natives. Thus, the evidence suggests that the effect of immigration is closely 
related to the phase of the business cycle. 
In the fifth row, we control for the possibility that the immigration share is driven by changes 
in the native workforce. As can be seen, the results remain quantitatively intact, thereby pointing 
to the robustness of our baseline specification. The results also appear to be robust even when 
employing regressions without weights (Row 6). Row (7) uses hours instead of labour market 
participation as the key exogenous covariate. Again, the results suggest small adverse effects on 
the employment opportunities of native male workers.  
Given that labour market participation may introduce some endogeneity, in Rows (8) and (9) 
we report evidence from an instrumental variables approach26. Specifically, we use the immigrant 
share one period before and the share in the working age populations, assuming that there is 
significant correlation with contemporaneous immigrant density but no correlation with the 
employment outcomes variables. In Row (8), the estimated impact of immigration accounting for 
potential endogeneity is stronger and highly statistically significant. The results also suggest that 
measurement error in the key independent variable may also induce downward bias. By contrast, 
Row (9) returns parameter estimations in the same ballpark as in baseline specification.  
Specification (10) accounts for attenuation bias in a different way. Specifically, we merge years 
in pairs beginning with 1998/1999 and ending with 2014/2015, in order to increase the sample size 
                                                 
26Besides addressing potential endogeneity, Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates are also considered to attenuate the 
consequences of measurement error in the key independent variable (e.g. Dustmann Fabbri and Preston, 2005).  
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per skill-cell27. Evidently, the link between immigration and the employment outcomes variables 
appears to be stronger than in the baseline specification. 
Next, we assume that men and women are relatively good substitutes in the labour market. 
Markedly, Row (11) yields estimates very similar to those reported without including females. The 
twelfth specification, reports evidence of imperfect substitutability between female natives and 
immigrants. In Rows (13) to (16) we check the robustness of our baseline results by: (1) dropping 
from the sample those cells with less than 300 observations, (2) grouping workers into four, ten 
year experience bands, (3) using four education groups (primary education, lower secondary, upper 
secondary and university), (4) classifying workers into two education categories (high school 
education or below and university) and (5) using age bands instead of experience bands. As can be 
verified, the unemployment results remain qualitatively identical to those reported in Row (1). On 
the other hand, the results regarding employment and average hours appear to be somewhat 
sensitive, Nevertheless the pattern of the coefficients is consistent with the hypothesis of imperfect 
substitution between immigrants and natives in the short-run. 
In Rows (18) and (19), we move beyond average effects and estimate the regression model 
within schooling and experience groups28. The group of natives with ten years of experience and 
below and that of the less-skilled appear to be more adversely affected by immigration. In contrast, 
high-school and university graduates gain in terms of employment. Finally, in the fourth row of 
Specification 18, we eliminate individuals with less than ten and more than thirty years of 
experience29. Although the results are slightly weaker, still there is a short-run deterioration in the 
employment prospects of natives due to immigration.
                                                 
27
 Edo (2015) uses a similar strategy for France.  
28
 Note, however, that the within education groups estimations must be interpreted with some caution, since they 
include only experience and year fixed effects.  
29
 The idea is to check the robustness of the baseline results by removing workers with low attachment to the labour 
market, that is, young and near retirement individuals. 
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Table 3 The Impact of the Immigrant Share on the Labour Market Opportunities of Native Education-
Experience Groups 
Dependent variable 
Unemployment to 
Labour Force 
Employment to 
Population Average hours Obs. 
1. Baseline Regression 0.219*** -0.365** -0.196* 432 
 (0.039) (0.153) (0.097)  
2. Long term immigrants 0.380*** 
(0.131) 
-0.328* 
(0.175) 
0.022 
(0.155) 
432 
3. 2008-2015 subsample 0.219* 
(0.115) 
-0.702*** 
(0.155) 
-0.457*** 
(0.134) 
192 
4. 1998-2007 subsample 0.020 
(0.050) 
0.082 
(0.138) 
-0.119** 
(0.056) 
240 
5. Includes log native labor 
force as regressor 
0.218*** 
(0.039) 
-0.283*** 
(0.093) 
-0.177** 
(0.084) 
432 
6. Unweighted Regression 0.279*** 
(0.062) 
-0.441** 
(0.210) 
-0.196 
(0.117) 
432 
7. Hours instead of labour 
force.  
0.239*** 
(0.035) 
-0.343*** 
(0.104) 
-0.232** 
(0.087) 
432 
8. Immigrant share one period 
before. IV 
0.691*** 
(0.113) 
-1.112*** 
(0.281) 
-0.448** 
(0.215) 
336 
9. Immigrant share in working 
age population. IV 
0.228*** 
(0.034) 
-0.280** 
(0.121) 
0.0235 
(0.054) 
432 
10. 9 years instead of 18 0.367*** 
(0.103) 
-0.662* 
(0.349) 
-0.365 
(0.219) 
216 
11. Men and women in the 
dependent variable and  
0.195*** 
(0.053) 
-0.430*** 
(0.136) 
-0.159 
(0.096) 
432 
12. Only women in the 
dependent variable and  
-0.035 
(0.055) 
-0.178 
(0.108) 
-0.173 
(0.109) 
432 
13. At least 300 observations 
per skill cell  
0.208*** 
(0.069) 
-0.373** 
(0.146) 
-0.172* 
(0.086) 
407 
14. Four experience groups 0.209*** 
(0.059) 
-0.111 
(0.165) 
-0.059 
(0.074) 
216 
15. Four education groups 0.113*** 
(0.034) 
-0.172** 
(0.073) 
-0.001 
(0.099) 
576 
16. Two education groups 0.254*** 
(0.035) 
-0.310 
(0.181) 
-0.210 
(0.126) 
288 
17. Age instead of experience 
bands 
0.120*** 
(0.029) 
-0.130 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.064) 
432 
18. Heterogeneous effects by 
experience  
    
- experience [1-10] 
 
- experience [11-20] 
 
- experience [21-30] 
 
- experience [31-40] 
0.271*** 
(0.061) 
-0.018 
(0.122) 
0.240* 
(0.107) 
-0.118 
(0.077) 
-0.803* 
(0.324) 
-0.202 
(0.177) 
-0.263* 
(0.119) 
-0.733* 
(0.355) 
-0.026 
(0.054) 
-0.207** 
(0.052) 
-0.185 
(0.106) 
0.027 
(0.178) 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
                                                                                                                                             (Continued) 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
     
- experience [11-30] 0.192** 
(0.066) 
-0.182* 
(0.091) 
-0.049 
(0.0.72) 
216 
19. Heterogeneous effects by 
education 
    
- low education 0.220*** 
(0.054) 
-0.413*** 
(0.069) 
-0.239** 
(0.096) 
144 
 
- secondary education  -0.676* 
(0.294) 
0.231 
(0.539) 
0.169 
(0.099) 
144 
- university education  -0.519** 
(0.204) 
0.353 
(0.308) 
0.024 
(0.082) 
144 
Notes. Sample I: GRLFS data. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from 
regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native education-
experience group for the 1998-2015 period. Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients, and are adjusted for 
clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions, except for those reported in row 6, are 
weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions, except for those 
reported in row 15, include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions 
between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience 
and period fixed effects. Regressions in row 18 include experience and year fixed effects.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 4, we report similar estimates30, using Census data for years 1991 and 2001. As can be 
observed, immigration bears a positive and significant coefficient when the dependent variable is 
native male unemployment. Remarkably, and contrary to the results shown in Table 3, there is also 
a positive correlation between immigrant share and female unemployment. As for employment, we 
do not find statistically significant effects of immigration. In the last row, we estimate the impact 
of migrants on average hours worked. Again, our key independent variable enters with a negative 
and significant coefficient when the case of male workers is considered. In all other instances, 
immigration appears with a negative coefficient, but it is no more significant at the standard 
significant levels. 
 
                                                 
30
 In particular, we present results where the labour market is sliced into three education and ten age bands. We prefer 
this classification with Census data, given that it allows us to increase (slightly) the number of observations. 
Nevertheless, results (not reported) obtained via the usual education and experience bands are remarkably very similar 
to those in Table 3. 
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Table 4 Impact of Immigrant Share on the Employment Outcomes of Native Education-Age 
Groups 
 Men Women Pooled Men and 
Women 
Unemployment to labour force  0.275** 
(0.106) 
0.681*** 
(0.232) 
0.408*** 
(0.124) 
Employment to population -0.047 -0.148 -0.097 
 (0.159) (0.360) (0.756) 
Average hours worked -0.182** -0.072 -0.117 
 (0.081) (0.142) (0.368) 
Sample II: Census data 1991 and 2001. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share 
variable from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a 
native education-age group. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for 
clustering within education and age cells, All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the 
education-age-period cell. The regressions reported in the columns (1-2) have 60 observations. 
The regressions reported in the third column have 120 observations. All regressions include 
education, age, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and age fixed 
effects, education and period fixed effects, and age and period fixed effects.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In Table 5 we regress the mean log monthly earnings of natives on immigration and the usual 
set of fixed effects, namely, education, experience, year, education by year, experience by year and 
education by experience fixed effects. We report WLS and OLS estimates of equation (1) for the 
entire period by gender, as well as separate estimates for the period before since the onset of the 
Great Recession31.  In Columns (1-3), we report results for all workers, weighted for hours worked, 
while in Columns (4-6) we exclude workers with low attachment to the labour market, that is, 
workers with less than 35 weekly hours worked32. The idea is that if native workers with low 
attachment to the labour market respond to immigration by moving out of employment, the average 
native wage will increase, resulting in an upward bias in estimates of the direct effect of 
immigration on wages (e.g. Bratsberg and Raaum, 2012). 
                                                 
31
 Results using data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), are remarkably similar to those shown 
in Table 3 and are available upon request from the authors 
32
 In their empirical analysis, Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Bratsberg, Raaum, 
Røed and Schøne (2014) also report separate estimates from samples including and excluding part-time workers.  
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Table 5 The Impact of the Immigrant Share on the Log Monthly Earnings of Native Education-Experience Groups 
Specification 
(1) 
WLS 
(2) 
Unweighted 
(3) 
Before GR 
(4) 
During GR 
 (5) 
WLS 
(6) 
Unweighted 
(7) 
Before GR 
(8) 
During GR 
 
All workers, weighted by hours  Full time workers only 
Panel A. Average effects 
Men 0.029 -0.296** 0.353** -0.264*  0.043 -0.163** 0.276 -0.254* 
 (0.072) (0.107) (0.153) (0.135)  (0.057) (0.061) (0.169) (0.126) 
Women 0.099 
(0.233) 
0.216 
(0.181) 
0.097 
(0.112) 
-0.267 
(0.208) 
 -0.118 
(0.188) 
0.041 
(0.094) 
0.243 
(0.176) 
-0.398 
(0.366) 
Pooled Men and Women 0.100 
(0.071) 
-0.090 
(0.079) 
0.247* 
(0.125) 
-0.292* 
(0.126) 
 0.102* 
(0.056) 
-0.016 
(0.035) 
0.200 
(0.053) 
-0.195 
(0.157) 
Panel B. Heterogeneous effects by education group 
Men, Lower Secondary or below 0.001 
 (0.064) 
-0.362*** 
(0.104) 
0.280 
(0.207) 
-0.350** 
(0.152) 
 0.017 
(0.055) 
-0.209***  
(0.053) 
0.232 
(0.230) 
-0.327** 
(0.144) 
Men, High School Graduates -0.055 
(0.237) 
0.076  
(0.359) 
-0.108 
(0.331) 
-0.053 
(0.229) 
 -0.100  
(0.218) 
0.026 
(0.315) 
-0.219 
(0.351) 
-0.107 
(0.281) 
Men, University Graduates 0.305 
(0.279) 
0.160 
(0.334) 
1.204*** 
(0.256) 
0.148 
(0.525) 
 0.402 
(0.257) 
0.211  
(0.280) 
1.119*** 
(0.315) 
0.210 
(0.577) 
Panel C. Heterogeneous effects by experience group 
Men 1-10 years of experience 0.206 
(0.185) 
-0.174 
(0.110) 
0.492 
(0.352) 
-0.288** 
(0.107) 
 0.294** 
(0.095) 
0.228* 
(0.091) 
0.249 
(0.342) 
0.026 
(0.359) 
Men 11-20 years of experience 0.249 
(0.324) 
0.348* 
(0.173) 
0.081 
(0.426) 
0.416 
(0.271) 
 0.268 
(0.320) 
0.281 
(0.204) 
0.088 
(0.446) 
0.410 
(0.369) 
(Continued)
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Table 3 Continued 
 
Men 21-30 years of experience 0.251 
(0.206) 
0.112 
(0.160) 
0.461 
(0.410) 
-0.656* 
(0.291) 
 0.139 
(0.148) 
0.006 
(0.122) 
0.227 
(0.387) 
-0.674** 
(0.260) 
Men 31-40 years of experience 0.732*** 
(0.161) 
0.828*** 
(0.128) 
1.302*** 
(0.147) 
0.559* 
(0.241) 
 0.777*** 
(0.146) 
0.850*** 
(0.141) 
1.398*** 
(0.174) 
0.593* 
(0.257) 
Notes. Sample I: GRLFS data. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from regressions where the dependent variable is the 
log of monthly earnings for a native education-experience group for the 1999-2015 period. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the 
estimated coefficients, and are adjusted for clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions, except for those reported in rows 2 and 5, 
are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-period cell. Except for specifications in Panel B, all regressions include education, 
experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and 
experience and period fixed effects. The regressions reported in Panel B include experience and period fixed effects. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Usually, we find that there are no significant discrepancies between the all workers and full-
time workers samples, a result implying that our estimates are not immune to upward bias. WLS 
estimates indicate that the impact of immigration clusters around zero in male equations. 
Remarkably, regressions without weights indicate negative and significant effects on native wages, 
a result arguably driven by those cells with small number of observations. For instance, the implied 
elasticity for full-time workers is about -0.14, indicating that a 10%  increase in labour supply due 
to immigration decreases the average wage of male workers by 1.4%. Yet, when we split our 
sample in two subsamples (1999-2007 and 2008-2015), we find that immigrants exert a positive 
significant influence on male earnings before the Great Recession, while a robust negative 
relationship is ascertained during the Great Recession33. 
As for women, we fail to establish a significant link with immigration, even during the Great 
Recession. For this particular period, however, the estimated coefficients become more negative. 
When we pool men and women, we find a positive and significant coefficient for the sample of full 
time workers. Again, there is evidence that the impact of immigration differs with the stage of the 
business cycle. That is, migrants complement natives during the phase of economic expansion, and 
exert a harmful effect during the phase of the current recession.  
In Panel B, we estimate the wage equations separately for each education group. The first row 
shows a negative significant effect on the wages of less-skilled natives during the Great Recession. 
On the other hand, the impact of immigration on the earnings of high-school graduates turns out to 
be statistically insignificant in all specifications. Interestingly, university graduates appear to gain 
from immigration in terms of wages during the 1999-2007 period.  
Panel C reports estimates by experience groups. With the exception of the positive and 
significant relationship between the earnings of men with 31-40 years of working experience and 
                                                 
33
 The fact that Greece has been in deep recession since 2008 can be a confounding factor for the negative effects. Yet, 
when we introduce stronger controls (i.e. the unemployment rate per skill-cell), the results remain unaffected (we thank 
Giovanni Peri for bringing this fact in our attention). 
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immigration, we usually do not find significant results. There is, however, some evidence 
consistent with idea that immigration is harmful for the less-experienced native males and those 
with 21-30 years of working experience during the Great Recession.  
As a final exercise, we re-estimate the model using two alternative immigration measures, 
namely recent immigrants (with 10 or less years of residence in Greece) and veteran immigrants 
(with more than 10 years of residence in Greece)34. The rationale behind implementing such a 
strategy is to obtain a better understanding of whether the substitutability between natives and 
immigrants varies with the assimilation process of immigrants. If immigrants lack country-specific 
human capital (i.e. migrants are not perfect substitutes with natives upon arrival), their short-run 
impact is expected to be negligible.  However, as migrants accumulate human capital, they could 
compete more heavily with natives in the long-run. On the contrary, if immigrants happen to be 
perfect substitutes with natives upon their arrival in the host country, then one would expect large 
adverse effects in the short-run. Yet, as discussed in Section 3, there are many reasons to expect 
that in the long-run, the economy has the capacity to mitigate the initial negative influence of 
immigration on the employment opportunities of natives.  
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that recent immigrants compete more heavily with 
natives than veteran immigrants do. More precisely, with the notable exception of male 
unemployment, the coefficient of veteran immigrants becomes lower in magnitude and usually 
insignificant, when the impact of immigration on the employment outcomes of natives is 
considered. Interestingly, there is evidence that in the long-run, migration exerts a positive 
(significant) influence on male earnings. As for females, the results again point in favour of 
imperfect substitutability, either in the short-run or in the long-run.  When pooling men and women, 
                                                 
34
 A similar approach has been previously used by Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2006 and 2011), who report evidence 
that native wages are negatively correlated only with the fraction of immigrants with little experience in the Israeli 
labour market. On the other hand, Carrasco, Jimenez and Ortega (2008) find that the impact of immigration becomes 
more adverse as time of residence in Spain goes by. 
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the results are again consistent with the idea that the host economy can absorb immigration by 
creating new job opportunities. 
 
Table 5 The Impact of the Immigrant Share by Years of residence in Greece on the Labour 
Market Opportunities of Native Education-Experience Groups 
 
Recent Immigrants Veteran Immigrants 
Panel A: Men   
Log Monthly wages -0.148 0.143* 
 (0.130) (0.072) 
Unemployment to labour force 0.195*** 
(0.061) 
0.142*** 
(0.037) 
Employment to population -0.484** 
(0.225) 
-0.014 
(0.174) 
Average hours worked -0.351* 
(0.178) 
0.037 
(0.075) 
Panel B: Women   
Log Monthly wages -0.225 -0.066 
 (0.291) (0.096) 
Unemployment to labour force -0.031 
(0.096) 
-0.013 
(0.081) 
Employment to population -0.067 
(0.178) 
-0.101 
(0.111) 
Average hours worked -0.146 
(0.104) 
-0.089 
(0.081) 
Panel C: Pooled Men and Women   
Log Monthly wages -0.049 (0.124) 
0.127* 
(0.072) 
Unemployment to labour force 0.236* 
(0.132) 
0.054 
(0.049) 
Employment to population -0.513*** 
(0.175) 
-0.078 
(0.117) 
Average hours worked -0.310** 
(0.129) 
0.015 
(0.091) 
Notes. Sample I: GRLFS data. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable 
from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native 
education-experience group for the 2008-2015 period. Each cell contains estimates from a separate 
regression. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients, and 
are adjusted for clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions are weighted by the 
sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, 
and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, 
education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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7. Accounting for effective experience 
 
Thus far, we have assumed perfect transferability of human capital between Greece and the 
sending countries, that is, natives and immigrants pre-immigration experience is equally valued in 
the Greek labour market. However, given that immigrants upon arrival lack country-specific human 
capital (i.e. knowledge of language, host-country norms, nature of the labour market) (Chiswick, 
1978) an instructive exercise involves calculating “effective experience” before assigning them 
into education-experience cells and then compare the results to those obtained using the actual 
experience. Hence, following Borjas (2003)35, we assume that effective years of experience for 
immigrant workers are given by: 
0 = 123 − 34 + 53 − 3,     67 3 > 3493 − 34                                   67 3 ≤ 34  
where 3 denotes the age of entry in Greece and 34 the age of entry into the labour market. 
Parameters 2 and 5 translate experience acquired abroad and in Greece respectively by immigrants 
who migrated as adults (i.e. 3 > 34), into equivalent value of experience acquired by natives. 
Likewise, 9 rescales experience of immigrants who migrated as children (i.e. 3 ≤ 34). 
Next, we estimate the following generic assimilation regressions for immigrants who entered 
Greece as adults and children respectively36: 
 ;<=> =  +  ?@ABCD7<D +  ?ABCD=D + EF + G + ?     67  3 > 34 (3) 
 ;<=> =  + ?@HBCD=D + EF + G + ?                                      67 3 ≤ 34      (4) 
where   denotes education fixed effects, F are cohort of immigration dummies and  are year 
fixed effects. As for native workers, we estimate the following standard Mincerian specification: 
 ;<=> =  + ?@IBCD=D + G + ?                                       (5) 
Effective experience is then calculated using the following weights.  
                                                 
35
 See also Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2011). On the other hand, Bratsberg, Raaum, Røed and Schøne (2014) 
account for effective experience by simply ignoring any pre-arrival experience for Norway. 
36
 Because in the GRLFS years since immigration is set 11 for immigrants with more than 10 years of residence in 
Greece for the 2002-2007 period, we cannot distinguish between adult and child immigrants for that period. Hence, 
the analysis is restricted to data drawn from 2008 to 2015 cross-sections. 
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 2 = JKLJKM , 5 =
JNL
JKM, 9 =
JKO
JKM. 
(6) 
 
Table 6. The impact of different types of experience on the long monthly earnings of natives and 
immigrants  
 Group 
Coefficient of: Natives Child Immigrants Adult Immigrants 
Source country experience ̶̶̶ ̶ -0.002 
   (0.002) 
Source country experience squared 
÷ 10 
 
̶ 
 
̶ 
 
0.001 
   (0.001) 
Greek experience 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) 
Greek experience squared ÷ 10 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Mean value of:    
Source country experience ̶ ̶ 9.7 
Greek experience 21.5 12.9 11.7 
Marginal value of an additional 
year of experience for immigrants: 
   
Source country experience ̶  0.0006 
Greek experience ̶ 0.017 0.015 
Marginal value of an additional 
year of experience for natives, 
evaluated at mean value of relevant 
sample of immigrants 
 
 
 
̶ 
 
 
 
0.018 
 
 
 
0.013 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year of arrival dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 39,177 1,564 4,525 
Notes. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The 
regressions pool data for the 2008-2015 period. The regressions of immigrants include dummy 
variables indicating the year in which the immigrant arrived (1958-1962, 1963-1967, 1968-1972, 
1973-1977, 1978-1982, 1983-1987, 1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2012, 
2013-2015).***, **,* indicate significant at 1%,5%,10% significant levels 
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Table 6 reports the relevant coefficients from the above equations37. As can be seen, the 
experience of natives and child immigrants is almost equally valued by Greek employers. This 
implies that the weight 9 is estimated to be 1. Similarly, the implied weight  5 is also 1. On the 
contrary, given that the payoff to pre-immigration labour market experience is insignificant and 
close to zero, the implied weight 2 is 0. Consequently, we eliminate pre-immigration experience 
for adult immigrants and assign them into skill-cells accordingly. Since the mean value of source 
country experience is about 9.7 years, the adjustment for effective experience reallocates adult 
immigrants into lower experience cells and the supply shock in these cells becomes heavier than it 
is when actual experience is considered. 
 
Table 7 The Impact of the Immigrant Share Adjusted for Effective Experience  
 Dependent Variable 
 Log Monthly 
Earnings 
Unemployment 
to labour Force 
Employment to 
Population 
Average Hours 
Worked 
Immigration Share -0.254* 
(0.116) 
0.226** 
(0.082) 
-0.443*** 
(0.154) 
-0.274* 
(0.154) 
Notes. . Sample I: GRLFS data. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable 
from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native 
education-experience group for the 2008-2015 period. Each cell contains estimates from a separate 
regression. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients, and 
are adjusted for clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions are weighted by the 
sample size of the education-experience-period cell. All regressions include education, experience, 
and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, 
education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In Table 7, we present immigrant share coefficients, after having adjusted the sample for the 
effective experience of adult immigrants. Given that the estimates for effective experience cover 
the 2008-2015 period, the comparison with the estimates from the actual experience involves the 
entries in the third Row of Table 3 and the eighth Column of Table 4. As can be observed, the sign 
                                                 
37
 We have also checked the robustness of the experience coefficients using interval regressions. The results are 
qualitative similar to those reported in Table 4 and are available upon request.  
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and the significance of the immigrant share remain unchanged. However, the effect appears to be 
weaker when immigrants are assigned into skill-cells after having eliminated any pre-immigration 
work experience. 
 
8. A Comparison with the Spatial Correlations 
 
 
In Table 838, we collapse our data into region-education-experience-year cells and re-estimate 
the impact of immigration on the usual labour market outcomes of natives. As discussed in Section 
3, should migrants settle in regions with booming economic conditions, spatial correlations yield 
biased towards zero results. Hence, it seems interesting to compare the results from the spatial 
correlations with those previously obtained from the national approach (Table 3 and 4).  
Following Borjas (2003), each Column reports results based on different sets of fixed effects. 
Specifically, the first Column includes region, education, experience, and year fixed effects, as well 
as region by year, education by year, experience by year and education by experience fixed effects. 
The second Column adds a three-way interaction between region, education and experience fixed 
effects, while the third Column adds education by experience by year fixed effects. Finally, Column 
(4) includes region by education by year and region by experience by year fixed effects. We also 
report two set of heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The first set is adjusted for clustering 
within region-education-experience cells, and the second within region-year cells.  
As can be verified, when spatial units enter into the analysis, the effect of immigration on the 
employment opportunities of natives, usually appears to be insignificant. Of course, this finding is 
probably driven by simultaneity bias, that is, immigrants settle in areas where the labour markets 
are strong, thereby resulting in downward bias in the estimates of the direct effect of immigration. 
There is, however, some evidence in Column (1), that immigration exerts adverse influence on the 
employment outcomes of natives.  
                                                 
38
 The results reported in Table 7 are obtained using the command reghdfe in STATA. 
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Table 8. The Impact of the Immigrant Share on the Labour Market Opportunities of Native 
Region-Education-Experience Groups 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Monthly wage -0.003 
[0.027] 
[0.025] 
-0.023 
[0.036] 
[0.032] 
-0.039 
[0.038] 
[0.036] 
0.037 
[0.048] 
[0.043] 
2. Unemployment to labour force 0.154 
[0.025]*** 
[0.016]*** 
0.035 
[0.022] 
[0.020]* 
0.006 
[0.023] 
[0.022] 
-0.009 
[0.035] 
[0.029] 
3. Employment to population -0.302 
[0.186] 
[0.043]*** 
-0.075 
[0.027]*** 
[0.030]** 
 
-0.022 
[0.026] 
[0.029] 
-0.012 
[0.040] 
[0.036] 
4. Average hours 0.010 
[0.064] 
[0.037] 
0.031 
[0.025] 
[0.033] 
0.010 
[0.027] 
[0.028] 
0.020 
[0.037] 
[0.039] 
Controls:     
(Region by year), (education by 
year),  
(experience by year), (region by 
education) fixed effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
(Region by education by experience) 
fixed effects 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(Education by experience by year) 
fixed effects 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(Region by education by year), 
(region  by experience by year) fixed 
effects 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Notes. The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from regressions where 
the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native region-education-
experience group for the 1998-2015 period. Two sets of heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients. The first is adjusted for clustering 
within region-education-experience cells and the second within region-year cells. The regression 
on monthly wage has 5234 observations; the regression on unemployment to labour force have 
5580 observations; the regression on employment to population has 5595 observations; the 
regressions on average hours have 5555 observations. 
 
9. The impact of immigration on the task performance of natives 
 
 
Up to this point, we have analyzed the relationship between immigration and the labour market 
opportunities of natives. In this section, we build on previous literature39 that examines the 
                                                 
39
 See Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) for applications outside the 
immigration context. 
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immigration-task specialization of natives nexus (see e.g. Peri and Sparber, 2009; Amuedo-
Dorantes and de la Rica, 2011; D’Amuri and Peri, 2014; Ortega and Verdugo, 2014), seeking to 
provide new insight on whether and how immigration affects the task performance of native 
workers. As discussed in Section 3, these studies document that natives protect themselves from 
foreign-born competitors via a positive reallocation towards more complex tasks, complementary 
to manual tasks, usually performed by immigrants. 
There are, however, many reasons to believe, that, as far as the case of Greece is concerned, the 
occupational upgrading of natives is a priori ambiguous. As emphasized by Peri (2014), the 
mechanism of positive reallocation is weaker in some of the Southern European countries with 
inflexible labour markets and protective institutions. In order to capture the complex picture of how 
immigration affects the task specialization of natives, we combine GRLFS data with data on task 
measures across occupations, namely routine task intensity, abstract, routine and service task 
importances, calculated by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010)40. In Table 8 we regress the 
aforementioned task measures on the immigrant share and the usual set of education, experience 
and year fixed effects. Following Peri and Sparber (2009) and Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 
(2011) we focus on recent immigrants, i.e. those with less than 10 years of residence in Greece. 
Nevertheless, we also report results considering the impact of the entire pool of immigrants. In 
addition, we examine whether the effect, if any, differs with the phase of business cycle. 
Unlike previous studies, the evidence reported in Table 9, albeit not very much precise, 
indicates that immigration is positively associated with routine task intensity when the group of 
males is considered (Panel A). Given that routine task intensity is defined as the ratio of routine 
task importance to the sum of abstract and service task importances, the positive effect is mainly 
driven by the positive significant impact of immigration on the nominator variable and the negative 
                                                 
40
 The task measures are calculated at the O*NET occupational level, and then are converted into ISCO level. The 
relative values are reported in Table 4, p.49. 
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significant impact on the second denominator variable. Remarkably, the correlation between 
immigration and the task measures appears to be stronger during the 2008-2015 period. 
 
 
Table 9. The Impact of the Immigrant Share on the Supply of Tasks of Native Workers 
 All 
immigrants 
Recent 
immigrants 
1998-2007 
subsample 
2008-2015 
subsample 
Panel A. Men     
Abstract task 
importance 
0.473 
(0.307) 
0.621 
(0.421) 
-0.309 
(0.402) 
1.109** 
(0.448) 
Routine task 
importance 
0.956* 
(0.550) 
1.622* 
(0.899) 
0.751* 
(0.427) 
2.484*** 
(0.761) 
Service task 
importance 
-0.407 
(0.279) 
-0.838* 
(0.487) 
-0.591 
(0.382) 
-1.056** 
(0.439) 
Routine task intensity 0.648 (0.409) 
1.189* 
(0.693) 
0.669 
(0.399) 
1.770*** 
(0.619) 
Panel B. Women     
Abstract task 
importance 
0.217 
(0.368) 
0.165 
(0.338) 
-0.112 
(0.452) 
-0.399* 
(0.198) 
Routine task 
importance 
0.578 
(0.396) 
0.542 
(0.533) 
0.387 
(0.328) 
-0.139 
(0.828) 
Service task 
importance 
-0.166 
(0.276) 
-0.223 
(0.349) 
-0.095 
(0.448) 
-0.281 
(0.930) 
Routine task intensity 0.412 (0.257) 
0.406 
(0.379) 
0.297 
(0.341) 
0.029 
(0.761) 
Panel C. Pooled Men and Women   
Abstract task 
importance 
0.368 
(0.250) 
0.386 
(0.320) 
-0.279 
(0.376) 
0.611 
(0.448) 
Routine task 
importance 
0.838* 
(0.412) 
1.270* 
(0.706) 
1.061* 
(0.535) 
1.553* 
(0.834) 
Service task 
importance 
-0.419 
(0.327) 
-0.707 
(0.454) 
-0.745 
(0.462) 
-0.726 
(0.515) 
Routine task intensity 0.597* (0.346) 
0.992* 
(0.566) 
0.885* 
(0.475) 
1.162* 
(0.665) 
Notes. The table reports the correlation of the immigrant share with four measures of natives’ 
task performance for the 1998-2015 period. Each cell contains estimates from a separate 
regression. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients, and 
are adjusted for clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions include education, 
experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience 
fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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For females (Panel B), the inflated standard errors do not facilitate the inference, since the 
results appear to be insignificant at standard significant levels. The estimated coefficients appear 
to be much smaller than those reported for males, but the pattern remains unchanged. In Panel C, 
we pool Men and Women. The findings again confirm that higher immigrant concentrations are 
associated with stronger routine task intensity and routine task importance. 
Summarizing the evidence shown in Table 9, immigration causes a negative reallocation of 
natives towards non-complex, routine tasks. All in all, these results provide empirical support for 
the idea that in Greece, complex, formal sector jobs are usually not available for the outsiders, in 
light of the level of entry barriers legally imposed by insiders. 
 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Recent developments in the empirical literature of immigration have challenged the notion 
from the earlier spatial correlations studies that the effects of immigration are clustered around 
zero. Subsequent national, skill-cell studies (e.g. Borjas, 2003 and 2009, Ottaviano and Peri, 2012, 
and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth, 2012), have reported conflicting results. Along those 
lines, this study explores, for the first time, the labour market consequences of immigration in 
Greece. We show that the presence of immigrants, especially in the short-run, negatively affects 
the employment outcomes of Greek workers. On average, the estimated elasticities imply that a 
10% increase in the share of immigrants, decreases employment by 3% and increases 
unemployment by 1.8%. The group that appears to bear the cost of immigration is that of the less-
skilled natives. These results are consistent with those of Borjas (2003, 2014). 
On the other hand, native earnings appear less sensitive to immigration. That said, given the 
institutional setting in Greece, it is not surprising that immigration is negatively associated with the 
employment opportunities of natives in the short-run, but does not depress the earnings of natives. 
Remarkably, we find that the impact of immigration differs with the stage of the business cycle. In 
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particular, there is some evidence of complementarity before the Great recession. Yet, adverse 
effects are ascertained during the Great Recession. 
Of course this study has some limitations which have to be pointed out. First, as it is well-
known, the estimated impact of immigration could be attenuated by potential sampling error of the 
key explanatory variable (e.g. Aydemir and Borjas, 2011), although such errors tend to be low in 
the LFS (see e.g. Eurostat 2013).  Second, when we aggregate wages, the average size across cells 
is 912 observations. By contrast, in the employment equations, the average size across skill-cells 
is 1580 observations. Hence we are more confident about the robustness of the employment effects 
of immigration. The wage equations also reflect stark discrepancies between weighted and 
unweighted specifications. Consequently, we prefer specifications where the sample size of the 
education-experience-period cell is used as weight. This enables us to down-weight cells with small 
number of observations. 
What is more, the focus is on the short-run, where the capacity of the economy to absorb the 
supply shock without detrimental effects on the competing natives is very limited. Incorporating in 
the analysis the mechanism by which immigration restores the capital/labour ratio to its steady-
state level or other job creation mechanisms, that is, analyze the impact of immigration using a 
general equilibrium framework, should possibly contribute to a better understanding of the big 
picture. Noteworthy, our preliminary evidence is consistent with the idea that the impact of 
immigration becomes milder in the long-run. All in all, the substantial partial effects on natives 
labour market outcomes reported in this paper, mainly driven by the adverse effects of immigration 
ascertained during the Great Recession, highlight the need for considering changes in the structure 
of the labour and product market, rather than following the Malthusian rationale in migration 
policy-making.  Implementing structural reforms that will enable the country to break the vicious 
cycle of recession, and enter a virtuous cycle of growth, would make again possible for the 
economy to accommodate immigration without significant effects (as our results for the pre-crisis 
period imply).
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A 1 Bilateral Correlations between the key variables used in the paper 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Immigrant share 1.00         
2. Unemployment  0.47 1.00        
3. Employment -0.36 -0.66 1.00       
4. Average hours worked 0.23 0.03 0.23 1.00      
5. Log monthly earnings -0.59 -0.86 0.54 -0.27 1.00     
6. Abstract task importance -0.57 -0.57 0.32 -0.68 0.79 1.00    
7. Routine task importance 0.61 0.35 -0.18 0.70 -0.64 -0.90 1.00   
8. Routine task intensity 0.60 0.36 -0.19 0.71 -0.66 -0.92 1.00 1.00  
9. Service task importance -0.53 -0.25 0.10 -0.70 0.57 0.85 -0.96 -0.97 1.00 
10. Experience [6-10] 0.10 0.22 -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.05 
11. Experience [11-15] 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 
12. Experience [16-20]. 0.12 -0.07 0.21 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13. Experience [21-25] 0.03 -0.13 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
14. Experience [26-30] -0.07 -0.17 0.21 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
15. Experience [30-35] -0.16 -0.17 0.10 -0.02 0.23 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
16. Experience [36-40] -0.20 -0.18 -0.20 0.07 0.24 0.12 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 
17 Medium Education -0.23 0.02 0.00 0.33 -0.11 -0.31 0.09 0.13 -0.12 
18. High Education -0.48 -0.31 0.20 -0.78 0.57 0.90 -0.86 -0.88 0.84 
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Table A2 Unemployment Rate of Natives by Skill Cell, 1998-2015 
Education Years of Experience 1998 2002 2006 2010 2015 
Lower secondary and below 1-5 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.50 
 
6-10 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.28 0.49 
 
11-15 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.39 
 
16-20 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.31 
 
21-25 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.32 
 
26-30 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.22 
 
31-35 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.21 
 
36-40 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.19 
High school graduates 1-5 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.51 
 
6-10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.32 
 
11-15 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.21 
 
16-20 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.16 
 
21-25 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.18 
 
26-30 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.12 
 
31-35 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.17 
 
36-40 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.18 
University graduates 1-5 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.34 
 
6-10 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.19 
 
11-15 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.13 
 
16-20 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 
 
21-25 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 
26-30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 
 
31-35 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 
 
36-40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 
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Table A3 Employment Rate of Natives by Skill Cell, 1998-2015 
Education Years of Experience 1998 2002 2006 2010 2015 
Lower secondary and below 1-5 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.02 
 
6-10 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.43 
 
11-15 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.55 
 
16-20 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.63 
 
21-25 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.62 
 
26-30 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.71 
 
31-35 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.86 0.73 
 
36-40 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.70 
High school graduates 1-5 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.35 0.18 
 
6-10 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.75 0.53 
 
11-15 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.76 
 
16-20 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.82 
 
21-25 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.80 
 
26-30 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.83 
 
31-35 0.78 0.84 0.87 0.81 0.73 
 
36-40 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.58 
University graduates 1-5 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.56 
 
6-10 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.78 
 
11-15 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.86 
 
16-20 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.87 
 
21-25 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.88 
 
26-30 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.82 
 
31-35 0.64 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.72 
 
36-40 0.42 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.42 
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Table A4 Log monthly wage of Natives by Skill Cell, 2002-2015 
Education Years of Experience 1999 2002 2006 2010 2015 
Lower secondary and below 1-5 6.386 6.699 6.946 6.569 6.596 
 
6-10 6.584 6.803 6.959 6.674 6.541 
 
11-15 6.675 6.783 6.959 6.779 6.512 
 
16-20 6.762 6.795 6.925 6.849 6.693 
 
21-25 6.848 6.807 6.993 6.901 6.633 
 
26-30 6.895 6.847 6.938 6.948 6.663 
 
31-35 6.896 6.810 6.950 6.987 6.730 
 
36-40 6.908 6.790 6.935 6.998 6.754 
High school graduates 1-5 6.609 6.797 6.970 6.691 6.452 
 
6-10 6.698 6.825 7.002 6.804 6.565 
 
11-15 6.830 6.843 6.973 6.908 6.690 
 
16-20 6.932 6.849 6.967 6.970 6.757 
 
21-25 7.008 6.809 6.989 7.042 6.808 
 
26-30 7.060 6.808 6.988 7.119 6.822 
 
31-35 7.110 6.842 6.986 7.149 6.902 
 
36-40 7.120 6.790 6.974 7.173 6.916 
University graduates 1-5 6.906 6.870 7.210 6.908 6.692 
 
6-10 6.970 6.842 7.205 7.049 6.833 
 
11-15 7.144 6.855 7.226 7.158 6.964 
 
16-20 7.212 6.843 7.203 7.206 7.056 
 
21-25 7.274 6.827 7.188 7.297 7.118 
 
26-30 7.278 6.853 7.206 7.321 7.109 
 
31-35 7.386 6.853 7.208 7.350 7.235 
 
36-40 7.354 6.992 7.198 7.381 7.153 
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Table A5 Average hours worked of Natives by Skill Cell, 1998-2015 
Education Years of Experience 1998 2002 2006 2010 2015 
Lower secondary and below 1-5 41.112 41.459 38.794 38.339 45.100 
 
6-10 43.254 44.812 42.649 42.324 42.222 
 
11-15 45.066 44.789 43.621 42.628 42.310 
 
16-20 45.656 45.824 45.148 44.174 43.804 
 
21-25 45.357 45.412 45.084 45.063 44.290 
 
26-30 45.381 45.746 45.581 45.038 45.163 
 
31-35 44.674 45.137 45.446 44.657 43.863 
 
36-40 45.261 45.283 45.077 44.633 46.388 
High school graduates 1-5 42.485 42.197 40.698 40.878 39.407 
 
6-10 44.334 43.547 43.427 42.844 42.161 
 
11-15 44.181 44.890 44.412 43.982 43.955 
 
16-20 44.088 44.044 45.435 44.204 43.539 
 
21-25 43.400 43.760 44.460 44.760 44.459 
 
26-30 43.399 45.090 44.667 44.156 43.979 
 
31-35 41.978 43.612 43.807 44.223 44.383 
 
36-40 42.324 43.677 44.068 43.797 42.716 
University graduates 1-5 40.758 39.763 40.233 40.159 40.041 
 
6-10 40.599 40.940 40.832 40.983 40.369 
 
11-15 41.109 40.656 41.356 40.696 41.780 
 
16-20 40.245 39.964 40.116 39.869 41.385 
 
21-25 39.281 40.122 39.964 39.314 41.261 
 
26-30 39.538 38.243 38.715 38.897 39.117 
 
31-35 39.312 38.393 38.193 38.592 39.760 
 
36-40 38.571 39.741 40.434 39.831 40.530 
 
